The process of discovery for 18 important adverse drug reactions was analysed in terms of study designs and other features which determined whether published reports of suspected adverse reactions were convincing or provided valid evidence of causality. First alerts were almost always anecdotal reports.
Introduction
In part I an attempt was made to identify a list of important adverse drug reactions to form the basis for a review of the discovery process as it had existed in recent years, mainly since thalidomide. In part II2 3 the history of the discovery process and "avoidable delays" were reviewed in respect of 18 important reactions identified in part I. This paper attempts to analyse the processes leading to alerting for the adverse reactions on the basis of the characteristics of the 18 published reports identified as providing the first alerts.
Classification of discovery processes-The studies leading to identification are classified in two ways-firstly, according to study design and, secondly, according to the presence or absence of specific features which may affect the validity of any study irrespective of design.
Designs of reported studies
An adverse drug reaction may be regarded as a clinical event or illness in someone taking a drug as a result of an unwanted action of the drug. That adverse clinical events may occur from other causes, or for no known reason, highlights the need for an epidemiological approach to validation of suspected adverse reactions. Even when a drug apparently produces a unique or unusual clinical syndrome it is important to verify the frequency of occurrence of the defined syndrome in non-users. If this can be confirmed as very low then causality for a suspected reaction may be established on the basis of a small number of reports. Even under these conditions, and certainly in all other circumstances, an important factor in validation is the presence or absence of data on frequency. This may take the form of data on the incidence of the reaction among users of the drug or alternatively data on the prevalence of drug usage among patients with the particular clinical event defined as the suspected reaction. Having considered these three categories of study it is natural to consider whether any method of study might be possible which would provide information on both denominators, thus making it possible University Department of Community Medicine and General Practice, Oxford GEOFFREY R VENNING, BM, FRCP, visiting scientist (now director of research and development, Janssen Pharmaceutical Limited, Marlow, Bucks SL7 IET)
to estimate the incidence of a suspected adverse reaction among users of a drug and also the prevalence of drug users among patients who experience the clinical event which is suspected of being an adverse reaction. The only type of study with these characteristics is a record linkage system. Apart from pilot studies such as that in Oxford by Skegg et a15 this approach has not been applied, and studies in this survey are therefore classed as (a) cohort studies, (b) valid case studies, and (c) other studies.
Other factors affecting validity
In evaluating the discovery processes for adverse reactions defined criteria must be used for accepting or rejecting evidence of causality. The following definitions are used here. (a) Convincing: This is the level of strength of evidence accepted for defining an adverse reaction as verified. Evidence has not always constituted complete scientific proof but has been accepted where the author is convinced that the drug is a cause of the reaction without any reasonable doubt. (It is also noted that occasionally a suspected reaction is so serious and widespread that regulatory action may be justifiable on suspicion even when the evidence does not meet the criteria defined as convincing.) (b) Strong: Such evidence still requires verification but indicates a probability of causality. (c) Weak: This type of evidence does no more than raise the possibility of causality.
The following features of clinical studies have been accepted as providing evidence to these standards.
CONVINCING EVIDENCE
Rechallenge data, particularly data on more than one rechallenge. Significant dose-response data may provide convincing evidence, even from studies with poor design features, with lack of information on the denominators defined above.
Control data-Here study design is critical. Data from prospective cohort studies are in theory stronger than data from case-control studies, but where due attention is paid to possible confounding factors the latter may be convincing.
Experimental data on mechanisms of pathogenesis-Rawlins and Thompson6 classified adverse reactions into type A where the adverse effect is a consequence of the pharmacological action of a drug, often predictable and dose dependent, as distinct from type B, which are idiosyncratic. Reports of type A reactions are in general, almost by definition, convincing.
Evidence from close association in time and space-Although not encountered in this study, it must be recognised that local reactions at the site of injection and immediate adverse reactions such as acute anaphylaxis at the time of drug administration can normally be accepted as convincing.
STRONG EVIDENCE
Uniqueness of adverse event-This would include, for example, special clinical or histological features.
Extreme rarity of adverse event in the absence of drug usage. Self evident.
Data on minor variations of adverse reaction orformesfrustes-(Here the problem arises that one cannot assume that a drug that consistently causes minor changes in organ function can necessarily be held responsible for occasional severe dysfunction.) WEAK EVIDENCE Association of drug with common or only moderately rare events relative to extent of usage of drug-This would include, for example, the first reports of myocardial infarction in association with oral contraceptives.
Demonstration of pharmacological actions of drug not established as relevant to pathogenesis of adverse reaction-This would, for example, include the argument that oral contraceptives were likely to cause thromboembolism because effects on clotting factors had been detected; there was no evidence that these factors were relevant to the pathogenesis of thromboembolism.
Improvement after withdrawal, when not supported by rechallenge data, offers only weak evidence of causality. features, however, were not the main reasons for the validity in the three cohort studies, but they were important in the two case stuldies.
Results
In the phenformin study the strength of the evidence rested primarily on the experimental evidence for the mechanism of the adverse effect; the study design, which made it possible to assess the incidence of the reaction, naturally added to the strength of the evidence. In the methysergide report two patients were observed with an unusual adverse reaction. The physician published information on all patients he had treated with the drug (500), thus giving data on incidence of the reaction. This made the report somewhat more convincing than an anecdotal report of two cases of the suspected reaction with no information on the denominator of drug usage. Data on incidence from a series of this kind, however, may be biased by selection for publication; other users with equal experience uncomplicated by adverse reactions may be less likely to publish. The same applies to the phenothiazine report. In the phenacetin and stilboestrol studies unusual histological features were identified; the study designs ensured that all patients with these features were reviewed, so that the prevalence of drug usage among patients with the reaction could be assessed.
The remaining 13 publications were anecdotal reports, often of single cases; in some of these, however, the evidence was strong. The practolol keratoconjunctivitis report identified special clinical features, as did the Australian report of deaths from asthma associated with aerosols which identified a cardiac type of death. (The story of this adverse reaction is complex. Deaths from asthma in childhood and subsequently shown to be attributable to aerosols were not usually cardiac.) In other anecdotal reports the strength of the evidence depended on the rarity of the clinical event in the absence of drug use. This is, of course, relative to the extent of drug usage in the population. A few cases of aplastic anaemia with a drug of limited use would be strong evidence. The first anecdotal reports associated with chloramphenicol were less convincing, as the drug was in very widespread use at the time. Further verification was needed (and was obtained quite promptly). Five of the anecdotal reports lacked good evidence of causality. I have shown elsewhere7 that first alerts of this kind may turn out to be false alarms and not form a logical basis for regulatory action. When, however, the suspected adverse reaction is as serious as fatal pulmonary embolism or myocardial infarction in a young woman or hepatic necrosis with a new anaesthetic or the widespread occurrence of subacute myelooptic neuropathy, which reached epidemic proportions in Japan, then verification or refutation becomes an urgent matter. The other first alert which failed to provide good evidence was the practolol dermatitis report. Of itself, this was not a very serious reaction. Skin reactions to drugs are common, and perhaps this should be taken into account in assessing the strength of the evidence. Two years later different authors verified causality by patch testing and rechallenge. If this had been done in the earlier study this adverse reaction would not have needed further verification.
The present state of alerting to adverse reactions to drugs is that anecdotal reports provide the main source of information. Many discussions of the problem in recent years have considered the possible value of national voluntary reporting systems, the British yellow card system in particular, hospital surveillance schemes such as the Boston Collaborative Drug Surveillance Program, extension of phase IV (postmarketing) trials into monitored release schemes for postmarketing surveillance, and monitoring of national morbidity and mortality statistics. It is salutary to note the contribution these procedures made to the alerting process for these 18 important adverse reactions. The only actual first alert from any of these mechanisms was the Australian Drug Regulatory Agency warning on deaths from asthma associated with aerosols. This may have been fortuitous in so far as the alert related to a cardiac mechanism of death in adults, whereas subsequent studies eventually verified a real problem confined to children and not characterised by cardiac death. Monitoring of mortality statistics contributed to solving this problem and was the first alert in Britain, one year after the Australian warning, which appears to have been overlooked elsewhere. The British yellow card system, phase IV clinical trials, and hospital schemes such as the Boston programme did not contribute to alerting to these 18 reactions, but the yellow card system began only in 1964 and the surveillance programme in Boston in 1966. From then on, however, these systems failed to provide early warnings for the eight remaining reactionsthree effects of practolol and the reactions to aerosols, stilboestrol, lincomycin, and clioquinol.
LESSONS TO BE LEARNT
Lessons for the clinical stage-Study design features such as randomisation and control data are now almost universally recognised as critical for establishing the efficacy of new drugs. Although these particular features have not proved to be critical for early alerting to suspected adverse reactions, the importance of event recording has been identified, in the study which proved capable of showing the relation between practolol and eye complaints in a series including only 71 patients. Observations on control periods incorporated into the study were important. Possibly the combination of event recording with the use of patients as their own controls may in the future lead to earlier alerting at the clinical trial stage, through identification of significant excesses of minor organ specific complaints which may provide an early warning of less frequent but more serious adverse reactions affecting the same organ.
Lessonis for regulatory agencies for alerting-So far as the Committee on the Safety of Medicines is concerned it is salutary to note that the yellow card system made no contribution to first alerting for any of the important adverse reactions identified. (The value of the system for verification will be considered in part IV.) I have shown elsewhere that some anecdotal reports could form a satisfactory basis for regulatory warnings.7 They should also trigger specific action to ensure early verification.
I thank Sir Richard Doll, Professor Abe Goldberg, Dr G Jones, Dr David Skegg, and Professor Martin Vessey for helpful comments and criticisms.
Part IV of this series zvill be published next week.
